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I
n the tradition of Eurocentric historiography, the dominant narrative of the 
global economy places Western Europe well ahead of India, China, the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In other 
words, Western Europe’s economic superiority was an established fact before 
the Industrial Revolution or the growth of Western empires in Asia and Africa. 
Th   e Eurocentric historians insist that the origins of Western Europe’s economic 
ascendancy must be sought in long-lasting diﬀ  erentia between Europe and 
the rest of the world. Th  ese  diﬀ  erentia have been variously located in Europe’s 
genes, culture, divine Providence, cultural heritage—Hebrew, Greek, Roman or 
Germanic—superior governance and economic institutions, climate, geography, 
or some combination of the preceding factors.
Several of Europe’s leading thinkers had become convinced about Europe’s 
economic precocity towards the end of eighteenth century—and perhaps earlier. 
It is not our primary purpose in this paper to investigate these views—or when 
and why they began to emerge—but we do oﬀ  er in section one a cursory review 
of perceptions in eighteenth-century Europe about the economic superiority of 
their continent or parts thereof. 
In recent decades, Eurocentric accounts of the global economy have increas-
ingly come under challenge on several fronts. In particular, it appears that the 
foundational Eurocentric claim that Western Europe had taken an early eco-
nomic lead—perhaps as early as the beginning of the second millennium—is 
untenable. Instead of presenting new evidence on the question of early global 
disparities, this paper has a more modest goal. It reviews the growing body of 
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evidence that challenges the foundational Eurocentric claim regarding Western 
Europe’s early economic lead. It turns out that the claims of Europe’s early lead 
are based primarily on estimates of a single statistic—per capita income—at dif-
ferent points in the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. Section two points 
out that this approach is not only plagued by conceptual problems but it makes 
demands on historical data that are generally unavailable and, hence, have to be 
constructed on the basis of questionable assumptions. Even so, a careful examina-
tion of the available conjectural estimates does not support claims that Western 
Europe had a substantial lead over the rest of the world at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Th   ankfully, we do not have to rely exclusively on question-
able estimates of early per capita income to test the foundational Eurocentric 
claims. Instead, we can use several alternative indices of living standards in the 
late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, such as real wages, labor productiv-
ity in agriculture, and urbanization. A review of the evidence on these alternative 
indicators in section three fails to conﬁ  rm claims of European superiority. In 
section four we examine the progress of disparities—including the presence of 
regional patterns—using estimates of per capita income. In a concluding sec-
tion, we oﬀ  er comments on how the absence of an early West European lead 
might aﬀ  ect our attempts to explain a divergence in the growth paths of Western 
Europe and the rest of the world, starting in the early nineteenth century.
1. contemporary assessments of early disparities
Th   e conviction that Western Europe had achieved much higher levels of civ-
ilization than Asians or Africans was ﬁ  rmly established among European writers 
before the Industrial Revolution. 
Towards the late eighteenth century, if not earlier, most European thinkers 
had rejected medieval notions of an East that was fabulously rich. Europeans 
were now convinced that the old societies of the East were in a stage of develop-
ment they described as ‘barbarian,’ ahead of the ‘savage’ societies in Africa but 
distinctly behind the ‘civilized’ societies of Europe, who, in the words of Voltaire, 
were “tardy” in their “discoveries,” but then had “speedily brought everything to 
perfection” (Gordon 1997:134). Oriental societies, they believed, had acquired a 
settled agriculture and a small urban sector in ancient times but they had made 
little progress since then in the sciences, technology, governance and other arts 
of civilization. As a result, the working classes in Oriental societies still lived in 
great poverty compared to their counterparts in Europe (Goldman 1997:146–71; 
Gordon 1997; Larrain 1989:22–7; Winch, 1965:159–65).
Among classical economists, Adam Smith alone did not fully subscribe to 
these views. “China,” he wrote, “has been long one of the richest, that is, one of 
the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries 
in the world” (1937:71). Further, “in manufacturing art and industry, China and 
Indostan, though inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe” 
(1937:206). Nevertheless, he avers that the “real price of labor” is lower in India 
and China “than it is through the greater part of Europe.” Indeed, the poverty 
“of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the most beggarly 
nations in Europe” (1937:72).
Th   e devaluation of Oriental societies is, at bottom, an expression of Europe’s 
growing military superiority over Asian societies. In the ﬁ  eld of naval warfare, 
this superiority had been demonstrated as early as the sixteenth century when 
the Portuguese established a dominant position over much of the trade of the 
Indian Ocean. Starting in the mid-eighteenth century in India, this superiority 
was slowly extended to land warfare as well.¹ By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, most European writers and statesmen were convinced that the peoples 
of Asia and Africa would be unable to resist Europe’s growing military power. As 
a result, Europeans created a new worldview, one which embedded their grow-
ing military superiority in historical advantages which they always enjoyed over 
the nations of Asia and Africa. Over the next two centuries, these Eurocentric 
ideas would be used to explain and justify Europe’s colonization, enslavement 
and destruction of non-European peoples.
In the case of India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there 
existed another reason for exaggerating the poverty and misery of its working 
classes. As they faced growing competition from imports of ﬁ  ne but cheap Indian 
cottons, the domestic manufacturers in Europe sought increasing protection on 
the plea that Indian textiles were cheaper because they paid pauper wages to their 
workers. Daniel Defoe was making this argument as early as 1728; the wages paid 
to Asian workers would “fright us to talk of it, and their way of Living raise a 
Horror in us to think of it” (quoted in Parthasarathi 1998:80). In a parliamentary 
debate, John Basset claimed that “people in India are such slaves as to work for 
less than a penny a day, whereas ours here will not work for under a shilling” 
(quoted in Parthasarathi 1998:80). It did not occur to these observers that low 
Indian wages were more than oﬀ  set by even lower prices of consumables. 
¹. Michael Adas () has described how Europeans employed their growing 
advantage in scientiﬁ  c knowledge and scientiﬁ  c instruments as a measure of their overall 
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into u.s. dollars, the haircuts produced in Bangladesh enter their dollar-denomi-
nated gdp at $1 per haircut, whereas the haircuts produced in the u.s. enter their 
dollar-denominated gdp at $10 per haircut. In other words, the exchange-rate 
conversions do not produce comparable gdps for the rich and poor country. 
Indeed, this method seriously underestimates the per capita income of the poor 
country.
In order to derive comparable estimates of the gdp in Bangladesh and the 
u.s., we would have to evaluate them at a common set of prices—the prices of 
Bangladesh or the u.s. or some combination of the two. Alternatively, we could 
use the purchasing power parity (ppp) between the dollar and the taka to convert 
the gdp of Bangladesh and the u.s. into a common currency. Using the exchange 
rate between the u.s. dollar and the Bangladeshi taka—the method used by 
Kuznets and Zimmerman—the per capita income of Bangladesh was $320 in 
2002. When we use purchasing power parity between the two currencies, the per 
capita income for Bangladesh in 2002 was $1720 (World Bank 2003:252). In this 
particular case, the corrected benchmark estimate is greater than the ﬁ  rst esti-
mate by a factor of 5.4. In general, these correction coeﬃ   cients are largest for the 
poorest countries: the lower wages of poorer countries produce correspondingly 
lower prices, especially for non-tradable goods and services. 
Th   e conventional measures of per capita income introduce another downward 
bias in the backward projections for lagging countries. Th   e gdp is a truncated 
measure of the productive activities in an economy: it excludes (i) the output of 
the household economy, (ii) the underground economy, and (iii) the illegal econ-
omy. Nearly always, each of these sets of excluded activities is relatively larger 
in the lagging countries. During the early 1990s, the size of the underground 
economy in the lagging countries, expressed as a percent of their oﬃ   cial economy, 
ranged from 25–35 percent (for Chile, Costa Rica, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay 
and Columbia) to 68–76 percent (for Nigeria and Egypt). Th  e  corresponding 
shares for the advanced countries are much smaller for the same period; they 
ranged from 8–10 percent (for Japan, the u.s., Switzerland and Austria) to 27–30 
percent (for Greece and Italy) (Frey and Schneider 2000:13–14). According to 
a diﬀ  erent study by Frey and Wreck-Hannemann (1985: 100100), the size of 
the underground economy for the advanced countries in 1978 varied between 4 
percent for Japan to 13 percent for Sweden. It is likely, therefore, that when we 
incorporate all the excluded activities, the true per capita income of some lagging 
countries could increase by a factor of two or more. Th   e increase would be much 
smaller for the advanced countries.
Th  e growth rates of per capita income used in the backward projections 
are also problematic. Since these growth rates are derived from actual or recon-
structed national income accounts, they can be regarded as valid growth rates 
2. disparities in per capita income around 1800
Th   e comparisons of living standards across diﬀ  erent countries in the pre-
industrial era have relied primarily on estimates of per capita income. Th  is  has 
been unfortunate for two reasons. Not only does this approach make strenuous 
demands on data, it is also problematic conceptually.
In 1954, Simon Kuznets, easily the leading authority on national income 
accounts in his time, concluded that “per capita incomes in underdeveloped 
countries today are from about one-sixth to one-third of the per capita income 
of the developed countries a century ago” (p.144). According to L. J. Zimmerman 
(1962:35), another eminent expert on national income accounts, North America 
had notched a lead of nearly ten to one over China in 1860. Northwest Europe 
was in a less enviable position; its lead over China was only a little more than 
ﬁ  ve to one. Th   e economic historians did not know any better. When Britain 
was going through the Industrial Revolution, they maintained, the Indian and 
Chinese economies were still struggling at economic levels reached by Europe in 
the late Middle Ages (Lockwood 1954:3; Morris 1963:610). In other words, the 
global disparities we observe in our own times are not a product of the industrial 
revolution: they were well-entrenched before this revolution.
Th  e large early disparities—reported by Kuznets and Zimmerman—
between now-advanced and now-lagging countries are spurious. Th  eir  estimates 
are derived through exercises in ‘backward projection.’ Th   is was completed in 
three steps. First, they established benchmark comparisons, using exchange rates 
to convert the per capita income of advanced and lagging countries for a recent 
year—when national income accounts are available for both countries—into a 
common currency. Next, they estimated—guestimated is more appropriate—
the growth rate of per capita income for the two countries, starting with an initial 
year (say 1800) and ending in the benchmark year. In a ﬁ  nal step, they used the 
estimated growth rate to derive per capita income in the initial period.
It is odd that Kuznets and Zimmerman should use exchange rates to produce 
‘comparable’ estimates of per capita income. Anyone who has traveled from the 
u.s. (or any rich country) to Bangladesh (or any poor country) knows that most 
prices in Bangladesh (when converted into dollars), especially for non-tradables, 
are much lower than in the u.s.; often they are only a fraction of the prices in 
the u.s.² As a result, when we use the exchange rate to convert Bangladesh’s gdp 
². Th   e price diﬀ  erences represent a failure of arbitrage—buying cheap and selling 
dear. Th   is is not surprising since most services are not tradable between countries and 
even goods are costly to trade. Th   e lower prices for services in Bangladesh reﬂ  ect the low 
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only if the ratio of the excluded activities to the oﬃ   cial gdp remained unchanged 
over time. In the absence of any precise knowledge of how these ratios vary over 
long periods for the advanced and lagging countries, it would be impossible to 
determine the growth rates of the true gdp: the oﬃ   cial gdp plus the excluded 
activities. In the absence of this true growth rate, the backward projections would 
have to be abandoned.
In addition, the benchmark comparisons in the backward projections can be 
misleading because they compare per capita incomes for countries at very dif-
ferent stages of the demographic transition. Since many lagging countries have 
much higher dependency ratios (the proportion of their population that is not 
in the labor force because they are too young or too old), this exerts a down-
ward pull on their per capita income relative to the advanced countries. If the 
comparisons were undertaken in terms of productivity per worker, this would 
tend to reduce the historical gaps between the now-lagging and now-advanced 
countries.³
Th   e existing comparisons of per capita income in the early nineteenth cen-
tury also produce misleading results because of their obsession with countries 
as the units of comparison. Frequently, these comparisons involve countries that 
were of very unequal size in the early nineteenth century, such as Britain, the 
Netherlands, France, Brazil, the u.s., India and China. Th   e average income for 
a large country, such as India or China, could well be lower than that of any 
of these Western countries, but the most prosperous regions within India or 
China—comparable in size to any of the Western countries—might well be 
on the same economic level or better oﬀ   than Belgium, Britain or France. Th  is 
should not be surprising: the same resource or historical advantages that moved 
the Netherlands or Britain ahead of the rest of Europe could also produce simi-
lar peaks of prosperity within the most advantaged regions of India, China or 
the Ottoman Empire. It follows that in order to avoid making misleading com-
parisons, we should ensure that the units of comparisons, be they countries or 
regions within countries, have comparable populations. Comparing Britain to 
India can produce seriously misleading results. Instead, Britain should be com-
pared to the most prosperous regions in India, be they Gujarat or Bengal, or, 
alternatively, India should be compared to Europe.
We owe the ﬁ  rst set of historical comparisons using identical prices to Colin 
Clark in the 1950s. Indeed, he made two sets of comparisons, one for the rich and 
another for the poor countries, on the plea that the countries being compared 
should not be too dissimilar. If we use Clark’s (1957:46–7) benchmark compar-
isons for 1950, and growth rates of per capita income from Angus Maddison 
(1983), Britain’s per capita income in 1820 is roughly twice as high as the per 
capita income for Italy, Brazil and Japan. In the same year, France has a smaller 
lead over these countries.
Paul Bairoch (1981) has shown that the estimates of early disparities change 
dramatically when the backward projections are based on purchasing power 
parity rather than currency exchange rates. When Bairoch converted the gdp 
of all countries into 1960 u.s. dollar prices, his estimates show that in 1750, the 
Th   ird World had a per capita income of $188 compared to $182 for the developed 
countries. Only the ‘more developed countries’ at this time were marginally ahead 
of the Th   ird World with a per capita income of $230; but they had a similar 
lead over Western Europe whose per capita income was $190, and they had a 
larger lead over Eastern Europe with a per capita income of $165.⁴ Th  is  is  quite 
an impressive vanishing act, accomplished by an upward adjustment of 1.95 in 
the ‘current’ per capita income of the Th   ird World to make it comparable to the 
u.s. per capita income (Bairoch 1981:9). Centuries of Eurocentric myth-making 
about the precocious economic development of Europe, even Western Europe, 
disappear with a single correction in the backward projections. 
Th  e riposte to Bairoch’s iconoclastic results was quick. Two years later, 
Maddison (1983:30) launched a new set of backward projections, producing 
comparisons that show that in 1760 Britain had a lead of 1.9 over India, 2.0 
over China, and 2.1 over Mexico. France had a smaller lead of 1.6 over India, 1.7 
over China, and 1.8 over Mexico.⁵ In part, Maddison has generated these gaps 
by using smaller correction coeﬃ   cients, the result of his new benchmark com-
parisons based on direct comparisons of output. If Maddison had used Bairoch’s 
correction coeﬃ   cients, Britain’s lead in 1760 would reduce to 1.3 over India and 
1.2 over Mexico.⁶ Indeed, Maddison acknowledges, that if he had used correction 
³.  If labor productivity is measured per hour of work, this advantage may be oﬀ  set 
by the higher working hours per worker in lagging countries. 
⁴. Th   e developed countries include Europe, Japan, and North America; all other 
countries are included in the Th  ird World. Th  e most developed countries include 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
and the u.s..
⁵.  We are assuming that India, China and Mexico experienced no growth between 
 and ; most likely, India’s per capita income declined over this period, character-
ized by wars and poor governance, which dislocated trade and eroded the agricultural 
infrastructure.
⁶.  In large measure, Maddison’s smaller correction coeﬃ   cients are due to his as-
sumption that service workers in lagging countries—medical personnel, teachers and 
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coeﬃ   cients from Kravis, Heston and Summers’ (1982) International Comparison 
Project, his “1760 position would be virtually as Bairoch claims” (Maddison 
1983:32).
Th   e growth rates employed by Maddison for his backward projections for 
lagging countries err in the opposite direction: they are too high. Th  us,  Maddison 
(1995:24) assumes a growth of 17 percent in China’s per capita income between 
1820 and 1950, a long period of economic decline brought about by ﬂ  oods, adverse 
climatic conditions, rebellions, civil wars, foreign invasions and anti-imperialist 
struggle.⁷ Bairoch (1981:14) assumes a decline of 21 percent in China’s per capita 
income between 1800 and 1950. Similarly, Bairoch (1981:14) assumes an annual 
growth rate of 0.6 percent for Latin America between 1800 and 1977 for his back-
ward projections. On the other hand, Maddison (1983:30) uses a growth rate of 
1.62 percent for Brazil and 0.98 percent for Mexico in his calculations.
Bairoch’s estimates of per capita income in China receive support from a 
recent estimate made by Jan van Zanden (n.d.). Using data from pre-industrial 
Europe, he has discovered a strong relationship between per capita income, on 
the one hand, and real wages and the share of the labor force in agriculture on 
the other. On the assumption that this relationship holds for all countries in the 
pre-industrial epoch, van Zanden estimated the per capita income for China 
and separately for Jiangnan, one of the more advanced regions in China. Th  e 
estimated per capita income for China in 1750 was only ten percent below that 
for Europe; China lagged behind England by 35 percent. However, Jiangnan, 
considered independently, was signiﬁ  cantly ahead of Europe but fell short of the 
English level by ten percent.
Th   e backward projections face yet another problem: they evaluate the gross 
domestic product in the initial period in terms of prices from the benchmark 
year. Given the large time gaps involved, the benchmark prices are likely to be 
quite diﬀ  erent from the prices for the early years. If the prices of primary prod-
ucts relative to manufactures have declined over time—a position held by sev-
eral development economists—this procedure is likely to skew the comparisons 
against the poorest countries if they had a relatively larger primary sector in the 
early years compared to the advanced countries. Fortunately, Leandro Prados de 
la Escosura (2000:27) has now provided estimates of gross domestic products at 
current prices, derived by a short-cut method, for several European countries and 
Japan. Generally, these new results narrow the gap between the poorest countries 
and Britain or the United States. Th   us, in 1913, according to Maddison’s back-
ward projections, the relative per capita income (u.s. = 100) was 27 for Japan, 24 
for Turkey, 24 for Portugal, and 46 for Norway. At current prices, the relative per 
capita incomes for the same countries were quite a bit higher, at 38 for Japan, 35 
for Turkey, 40 for Portugal, and 68 for Norway. Th  e  diﬀ  erences are signiﬁ  cant.
Shall we then turn to Bairoch or Maddison to construct our image of the 
world in 1760? We have argued that Maddison underestimates the historical per 
capita incomes of lagging countries because he fails to recognize the economic 
decline in China and India. In addition, because of his indefensible assumption 
about the relatively lower productivity of health, education and government ser-
vices in lagging countries, his correction coeﬃ   cients are too low. If these objections 
are valid, and we corrected for them, Maddison’s numbers might well converge 
on Bairoch’s estimates. In addition, if we corrected for activities excluded form 
conventional gdp and used current prices to evaluate gdp, it is likely that the 
advanced countries in Europe might be found to lag behind India and China in 
1760.
3. alternative measures of disparities around 1800
If we are unwilling to choose between Bairoch and Maddison on the ques-
tion of early disparities between Western Europe and the rest of the world, we 
must turn to alternative instruments that are correlates of per capita income and 
for which we are likely to obtain more reliable estimates from contemporary 
sources.
It is easy to identify a variety of indicators which are directly correlated with 
per capita income, such as wages, agricultural productivity, manufacturing pro-
ductivity, shares of agriculture in employment or income, urbanization, share of 
income spent on food, life expectancy, and average height of the adults in the 
population. In addition, one can also compare various indices of the degree to 
which the economy is commercialized. 
Th  ese alternative indicators have several advantages. In most cases, they 
make modest demands on data, which, in many cases, are readily available from 
a variety of contemporary sources. In some cases, these indicators may be esti-
countries. Th   is is scarcely plausible. Arguably, civil servants in most lagging countries are 
less productive because of overstaﬃ   ng, but it is unlikely that three of them are doing the 
work of one in advanced countries. On the other hand, labor productivity in the health 
and education sectors of most lagging countries is likely to be higher because of heavier 
workloads.
⁷.  Th   e growth rates used in the backward projections for China are speculative. 
Van Zanden (n.d.) has written about “the ‘underdeveloped’ nature of historical national 
accounting for China; for the period before  no serious studies are available, and the 
evidence for growth between  and , and again after  is quite shaky.” A more 
detailed critique of Maddison’s () assumptions is oﬀ  ered in Alam (:–).M. Shahid Alam 46 Global Disparities Since 1800 
wages for the South Indian and London weaver were comparable, and both had 
an advantage over the weaver in rural and small-town Britain. In spinning too, 
the South Indian workers had a marginal advantage. Although Parthasarathi 
uses the wages of ‘outcaste’ and ‘untouchable’ workers in South Indian agriculture, 
those with the lowest social status in India, they come oﬀ   no worse than work-
ers in British agriculture. Since Indian workers were more likely to be employed 
year round, they may well have held the advantage in terms of annual earnings. 
In addition, the South Indian worker of the eighteenth century was in a privi-
leged position, compared to his English counterpart, with regard to his bargain-
ing position in the labor market and the political order. Th   is is conﬁ  rmed by 
Fernand Braudel (1992), who writes that the Indian “weaver was undoubtedly 
given a certain amount of leeway: he received his advance in money (not, as in 
Europe, in materials); and he could always resort directly to the market, some-
thing not open to worker operating in the Verlagssystem. What was more, he 
could always default, change his place of work, even go on strike and give up the 
loom to return to the land or join the army” (p.508). Th   e Indian workers would 
lose most of these rights when India was colonized by the British.
Although grain wages are likely to be a good proxy for real wages if work-
ers are spending a large fraction of their income on grains, this may not hold 
if the grain price of manufactures varies widely across countries.⁸ Fortunately, 
Robert Allen (2001) has estimated the purchasing power of wages in Europe 
and Asia for a basket of wage goods. According to his estimates, the real wages 
of Indian farm workers in 1600 were 10 percent higher than in England, and 21 
percent below those in Northern Italy. In 1750, the same wages in China and 
Japan were 18 percent below those in England, and 10 percent below those in 
Northern Italy. On the other hand, urban real wages in the commercial centers 
of Northwestern Europe—which remained at the peak they had reached after 
the Black Death—were above the wages in India and China. According to Allen 
(2001:11, table 4), this dynamic urban growth pole seems to be lacking in Asia. 
However, he acknowledges that “a more extensive Asian data base would reveal 
a parallel: the absence of information on urban Chinese wages is particularly 
troubling in this regard” (p.11). 
In addition, two historians of the Turkish economy have now estimated 
the real wages of construction workers in Istanbul from 1489 to 1914 (Özmucur 
and Pamuk 2002). Th   eir results show that real wages of skilled and unskilled 
mated from a small number of observations even when these have not been gen-
erated randomly. Th   us, if we can estimate the life expectancy of peasants in one 
village (not favored, say, by virtue of its proximity to a big city), this is likely to be 
representative of the larger population; with two or more samples, we would be 
on more solid ground. Finally, the availability of several of these alternative indi-
cators for two countries should allow us to determine their development ranking 
with greater conﬁ  dence.
Wages. As recently as 1981, Eric Jones, a leading economic historian, in a 
work overﬂ  owing with hubris, claims that real wages in Europe “tended to be 
high since at least the thirteenth century, compared with India even in the twen-
tieth century” (p.3). 
It is well known that money wages during the pre-industrial era were much 
lower in Asia than in Europe. According to the directors of the East India 
Company, French money wages in 1736 were six times their value in India. 
British wages at this time were still higher (Braudel 1992:520). Even the most 
acute European observers, including Adam Smith and Th  omas  Malthus,  took 
this as proof of miserable living conditions in Asia. It did not occur to them that 
lower money wages did not have to spell misery, since this would also translate 
into correspondingly lower prices of food and manufactures. Incredibly, these 
corrections have been made only recently, and they are beginning to reverse con-
ventional notions about the poverty of Asian wages in the pre-industrial era.
Th   e proportion of their income that workers spend on food can tell us a 
great deal about the purchasing power of their wages. Th   e evidence from a vari-
ety of contemporary sources from the eighteenth century in Britain indicates 
that British workers, certainly no worse oﬀ   than workers in continental Europe, 
were still spending a large fraction of their income on bread alone. According to 
Christian Peterson (1995), who has carefully investigated the place of bread in 
the British economy during the Industrial Revolution, “bread was overwhelm-
ingly the chief food, generally accounting for 40 to 80 percent or even more of 
weekly income, according to family circumstances and the prevailing price of the 
loaf” (p.4). As late as 1857, one observer commented that “it is no unusual circum-
stance for the entire earnings of a poor hard-working man to be expended upon 
bread only, for himself and his family”; even so, the workers were not “nourished 
as they ought to be” (Acton 1857:3). Certainly, these spending patterns do not 
lend support to claims that British workers in the late eighteenth century enjoyed 
living standards much above the subsistence level.
In 1988, Prasannan Parthasarathi compared the grain wages (the amount of 
grains that wages will purchase) in Britain and South India during the eighteenth 
century for workers in weaving, spinning and agriculture (p.84). After adjusting 
for diﬀ  erences in the calorie content of wheat and rice, he found that weekly 
⁸.  Broadberry and Gupta () cite the much lower grain price of manufactures in 
Britain to reject Parthasarathi’s wage comparisons for the eighteenth century. M. Shahid Alam 48 Global Disparities Since 1800 
construction workers in Istanbul in 1750–1799 were at least as high as wages in 
Paris, Valencia, Leipzig and Warsaw, and only marginally below wages in Vienna. 
In turn, all these cities lagged behind London, Antwerp and Amsterdam by a 
margin of about two-to-one. Further, real wages in Istanbul, beating the trend in 
many parts of Europe, held their ground between 1600 and 1800.
Labor Productivity in Agriculture. According to one Eurocentric narra-
tive, since Asians were unable to limit their fertility voluntarily, their popula-
tion tended to outstrip resources, resulting in low agricultural output per worker. 
In contrast, Europeans maintained higher levels of productivity in agriculture 
due to their greater success in limiting their fertility. It is doubtful, however,  if 
Europe as a whole enjoyed any advantage over Asia or the Middle East in agri-
cultural output per worker.
One set of estimates provided by Bairoch (1975:36, 40) suggests that Europe, 
Asia, Africa and Latin America had comparable levels of labor productivity in 
the ﬁ  rst half of the nineteenth century. Th   e average labor productivity, converted 
into millions of calories, was 5.1 for Asia (excluding China), 6.9 for Africa, and 
7.2 for Latin America (excluding Argentina) in 1909–1913. Th   e labor productiv-
ity for Germany was 7.5 in 1840, 7 for France in 1810, 6.5 for Sweden in 1810, 
and 4 for Italy in 1840. If we assume that the averages for Asia, Africa and Latin 
America had not changed much in the previous century, a reasonable assumption 
for Asia and Africa, the European countries do not appear to have a strong early 
lead. Almost certainly, the averages for Asia and Africa conceal higher levels for 
individual countries or regions within countries, which would exceed the num-
bers for Germany and France. Only Britain at this time, with labor productivity 
equal to 14 in 1810, would appear to be distinctly ahead of nearly every one.
A recently computed estimate of labor productivity in Javanese agriculture 
for 1815 suggests that it was not too far behind several European countries. Peter 
Boomgaard (2002) estimates that the male agricultural laborer in Java produced 
on average 3.3 million calories. Th   is was slightly higher than a labor productivity 
of 3.2 for Portugal but a fourth below the ﬁ  gures for Finland (4.1), Sweden (4.2), 
Spain (4.3) and Norway (4.5). Arguably, the other regions of Southeast Asia 
were no worse oﬀ   at the time.
Some of the standard Eurocentric notions of stagnant and impoverished 
Asian economies are now being severely tested by the newly emerging evidence 
on agricultural productivity in the Yangtze Delta, the most advanced region 
of China during the pre-industrial period. An early study on the economy of 
Songjiang, a segment of the Yangtze Delta that is particularly well documented, 
shows that labor productivity in this region increased by 30 percent from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century (Lee and Feng 1999:31). More recently, Li 
Bozhong (Li 1998:139–41) has shown that between 1520 and 1850, the popula-
tion in the Yangtze Delta increased from 20 million to 36 million, its average 
agricultural yield increased by 47 percent, and, more signiﬁ  cantly, the produc-
tivity of its agricultural labor went up by 52 percent.⁹ If we add to the higher 
labor productivity in agriculture the rising incomes from the redeployment of 
women to weaving and spinning, this translates into rising average incomes in the 
Yangtze Delta between 1620 and 1850. After his comparison of economic condi-
tions in Asia and Europe in the pre-industrial era, Pomeranz (2000) concludes 
tentatively: “…it seems likely that average incomes in Japan, China, and parts of 
southeast Asia were comparable to (or higher than) those in Western Europe 
even in the late eighteenth century” (p.49).
In addition, there is new evidence now on the high productivity of labor in 
the Yangtze Delta. Th   e results of Allen’s (2003) comparative study of the Delta 
and English Midlands show that “labor productivity in the Yangtze Delta was 
about 79 of that in England in 1800. While this was, of course, less than the 
English or Dutch achievement, it was considerably above that of most countries 
in Europe” (p.11). Even though the gross output per day worked in the Delta rose 
between 1620 and 1820, Allen’s results nevertheless show a decline in net output 
per day worked between these two dates. Th   is decline is the result of an implau-
sibly large deduction for seed and fodder in 1820; this deduction was somewhat 
less than two percent of the gross output in 1620 but rises to more than a quarter 
of the gross output in 1820. Finally, using Chinese weights, the earnings of the 
Delta family falls marginally below the income of the Midlands family; the use 
of English weights reverses this inequality. In other words, the “income race was 
a dead heat, and Pomeranz’s conjecture about Asian and European living stan-
dards is vindicated” (Allen 2003:14).
In this regard, Allen’s (2003) comment on the decline he reports in family 
farm incomes in the Yangtze Delta is revealing. He writes that “the Chinese tra-
jectory looks headed for a crash rather an industrial take-oﬀ ” (p.15). By this rea-
soning, at least six European countries which went on to achieve an industrial 
take-oﬀ   in the nineteenth century—Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Poland and 
Belgium—were also headed for a crash, since they too experienced a decline in 
agricultural output per worker between 1400 and 1800. Th   e declines in labor 
productivity were quite substantial: 41 percent for Austria, 34 percent for Spain, 
33 percent for Italy, and 31 percent for Germany. Since these results are from an 
⁹.   Shiba Yoshinobu ()—cited in Lee and Feng (:)—also has demon-
strated an increase in consumption and output per capita in the Yangtze Delta during 
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America was about 20 percent ahead, Asia 10 percent behind, and Africa 28 per-
cent behind the developed countries.
Of the major regions in Asia in 1800, only China appears to lag behind 
Western Europe in urbanization. For cities with a population of 10,000 and over, 
the urbanization rate in China in 1800 was 3.8 percent, compared to 10.6 percent 
for Western Europe (Maddison 2001:248). Bairoch (1988:357–8) thinks that 
China’s urban population has been underestimated, and he adjusts it upward 
to a range of 6–7.5 percent for cities with a population of 5000 or more. Th  is 
revised estimate is also quite low as compared to urbanization levels in the 11–14 
percent range at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Since China’s popula-
tion increased by a factor of 3.8–4.5 between 1500 and 1850, this large decline in 
urbanization appears problematical (Bairoch 1988:356–7). 
It is unlikely that the urban reversal in China could be the result, as Bairoch 
(1988:358–9) suggests, of a decline in agricultural output per worker produced by 
the population explosion during this period. Th   ere is no evidence of such an agri-
cultural decline. We are led, then, to think that the estimates of urbanization in 
China may be oﬀ   the mark. Th   is is strongly suggested by the evidence on China’s 
industrial structure. Recently, Li Bozhong (Li 1998:19, 23) has indicated that only 
43 percent of the labor force of the Yangtze Delta in 1850 was agricultural. Th  e 
comparable ﬁ  gures for several European countries were as follows: 35 percent for 
Britain, 41 percent for the Netherlands, 49 percent for Belgium, 62 percent for 
Germany, and 59 percent for France (Allen 2004:20). Could the percentage for 
all of China have been much behind that of Germany or France?
Th   e levels of urbanization in other major regions of Asia and the Middle 
East in the eighteenth century were at or above the levels for Europe. Using a 
cutoﬀ   population of 5000, the level of urbanization in all of Europe during the 
eighteenth century held constant at 11–13 percent. India started at the same level 
as Europe in 1700, but due to the breakup of the Moghul Empire, this ratio had 
declined to 9–11.5 percent in 1800. Japan increased its levels of urbanization over 
the eighteenth century, starting at 11–14 percent and ending the century at 14–15 
percent (Bairoch 1988:215, 400, 360). Th   omas Smith (1958:68) places the share of 
Japan’s urban population at 22 percent during the eighteenth century, compared 
to an average of 10–15 percent for Western Europe. Although not as densely pop-
ulated, according to Victor Liebermann (1995:797) ﬁ  ve percent of the population 
of Southeast Asia in 1650 lived in cities of 30,000 or larger. Th   is was higher than 
the ratio for Western Europe.
Although rates of urbanization may vary a great deal across countries 
(excluding countries with continental dimensions, such as India and China) 
even at similar levels of per capita income, we may reasonably expect rising per 
capita incomes in any country to produce higher rates of urbanization, especially 
earlier paper by Allen (1998:45), it would appear that, brieﬂ  y, he had forgotten 
his own estimates of agricultural decline in much of now-developed Europe. 
A comparison of the long-distance trade in grains suggests that Chinese 
food-producers were generating considerably larger grain surpluses than 
Europe in the eighteenth century. According to a conservative estimate by Wu 
Chengming (1985) that takes account only of the most important grain-trading 
routes in China, the grains entering long-distance trade in the eighteenth century 
were enough to feed 14 million people (cited in Pomeranz 2000:34). “Th  is  would 
be,” writes Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), “more than ﬁ  ve times a generous estimate 
of Europe’s long-distance grain trade at its pre-1800 peak and over twenty times 
the size of the Baltic grain trade in a normal year during its heyday” (p.34). As 
if this were not enough, the province of Shandong, “neither particularly com-
mercialized nor particularly backward,” imported enough grain per year during 
the eighteenth century to feed 700,000 to one million people (p.34). Th  us,  the 
grain imports of one Chinese province, with a population of 23 million in 1800, 
matched the long-distance grain trade of all of Europe (pp.34–5). Th   is trade was 
not included in Wu’s total for China’s long-distance grain trade. 
Urbanization. Th   e historical evidence on rates of urbanization across Europe 
and Asia do not support the income estimates for the early 1800s which give 
Europe a lead of better than two-to-one over China, India and Japan. It should 
be noted, however, that the ‘historiographical inequality’ between Europe and the 
rest of the world on urbanization is quite wide.¹⁰
At a highly aggregate level, Bairoch’s (1988:459) estimates for 1800 show that 
the levels of urbanization in developed countries, at ten percent of the total pop-
ulation, are only modestly above the urbanization levels in the Th  ird  World  at 
nine percent.¹¹ In disaggregated comparisons, Latin America (with an urbaniza-
tion rate of fourteen percent) is signiﬁ  cantly ahead of the developed countries; 
Asia is at the same level as the developed countries; and Africa (with an urban-
ization rate of four percent) lags signiﬁ  cantly behind all other regions. Th  ese 
urbanization rates are closely related to Bairoch’s (1981) estimates of per capita 
income for the diﬀ  erent regions in 1800. In terms of per capita income, Latin 
¹⁰.  According to Gilbert Rozman (): “Whereas de Vries [] found suﬃ   -
cient data to assign size categories to over  percent of cities with a population in excess 
of , in , over  percent in ,  percent in , and  percent in , 
East Asian specialists have not found population data for even as many as  percent of 
cases for most of these periods” (p.). 
¹¹.  Here the developed countries include Europe, the u.s., Canada, Australia, and 
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during the pre-industrial epoch when dramatic improvements in transporta-
tion could be ruled out. Indeed, an examination of the urbanization rates for 
Europe in 1700 show that these rates vary between 3.3 percent for Switzerland 
and 33.6 percent for the Netherlands (Maddison 2001:248). However, between 
1000 and 1800, the levels of urbanization in Europe (minus Russia) increases 
only modestly from 13.7 percent (deﬁ  ning urban as population aggregates of 
2000 or more) to 15.5 percent; this amounts to an increase of 13 percent over a 
period of eight hundred years. By Maddison’s calculations, the per capita income 
of Western Europe increased more than three-fold over this period, and the per 
capita income of Eastern Europe (minus the former u.s.s.r) increased by 67 
percent. On the other hand, the urbanization levels rise quickly from 15.5 per-
cent to 22.1 percent between 1800 and 1850, at a time when the steam engine had 
not made a signiﬁ  cant impact upon transportation by land or water (Bairoch 
1988:219; Maddison 2001:28).
4. polarization since 1800
Th   e economic parity across major regions of the world around 1800—and 
for several millennia before this—was replaced for the most part by growing 
regional disparities over the next two hundred years. Th   is departure from eco-
nomic parity is rooted in the exploitation of new energy sources. Productivity in 
the old agrarian economies, the dominant system of economy for several millennia 
past, was limited by a technology that harnessed energy from plants—an organic 
source—for most economic activities. Once the Industrial Revolution intro-
duced technologies that could harness energy from inorganic sources, primarily 
coal and oil, this eﬀ  ectively removed the constraint on the amount of energy that 
an economy could mobilize. Th   is new technology could not be acquired simulta-
neously by all societies, thereby creating the conditions for unequal development 
that has continued to the present day. Th   ose countries that were pioneers in the 
acquisition of this technology would not only get ahead, but they would use 
their growing economic and military power to establish structures that would 
perpetuate this initial disparity. It is not our purpose in this section to look at 
the structures that perpetuated these inequalities: we only wish to document the 
patterns of unequal development that have unfolded since 1800. We monitor this 
unequal development in terms of per capita income—despite our critique of the 
reliability of these estimates for early years—because we possess the most com-
plete time-series on these estimates. In addition, we are interested not so much in 
the size of the absolute disparities in the early years but the directions in which 
they have been changing since 1800.
First, consider an aggregate view of global disparities that compares per 
capita gross domestic product (pci) in the periphery and two central regions 
in the core of the global economy—the United States and Western Europe.¹² 
Using data from Angus Maddison (2001:23–4), Table One presents the growing 
lead that the United States and Western Europe experienced over the periphery 
between 1820 and 1998. Th   e leads are measured as the ratio of pci in these two 
regions over pci in the periphery. Th   e United States, the leading core region at 
least since the late nineteenth century, experienced a more than four-fold increase 
in its lead over the periphery between 1820 and 1950. However, the u.s. lead is 
partly diluted over 1950–1973, and although the lead widens again after 1973, the 
extension of the advantage is quite anemic compared to the period before 1950. 
Th   e progress of Western Europe’s lead over the periphery follows a somewhat 
diﬀ  erent path. Starting with roughly the same lead as the United States over the 
periphery—a lead of 2.2 versus 2.1—Western Europe continues to extends its lead 
till 1973. Th   e extent of this lead, however, is quite a bit smaller than that of the 
United States. In addition, Western Europe’s lead remains unchanged between 
1973 and 1998. Th  e  diﬀ  erences between the United States and Western Europe 
are due to the fact that the latter was falling behind the former till the 1950s, and 
then over the next quarter century—when Western Europe grew more rapidly 
than the United States—it greatly narrowed the lag. However, Western Europe 
failed to narrow the gap any further after 1973.
Very nearly the same picture emerges if we pursue the evolution of the leads 
using data from Bairoch (1981:7, 10). Th  e u.s. lead over the periphery—here 
deﬁ  ned to include Asia minus  Japan, Latin America and Africa—increased 
steeply from 1.3 in 1830 to 11.9 in 1950, but remained unchanged over the next 20 
years. If we could include the former u.s.s.r and Eastern Europe in our deﬁ  ni-
¹².  Th   e periphery is a comprehensive category that includes Eastern Europe, the 
former u.s.s.r, East Asia minus Japan, West Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Western 
Europe includes twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Table 1 – Global Disparities in PCI: Aggregate Views
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tion of the periphery, the u.s. lead between 1950 and 1970 would have declined. 
Th   ese two excluded regions grew rapidly over this period. 
Th   e evolution of America’s lead over the periphery suggests that the history 
of the global economy since 1800 may be divided into three phases: an extended 
period of rapid increase in global disparities between 1800 and 1950; a short 
period of reversal in these disparities, from 1950–1980; and the return of rising 
global disparities since the 1980s. We will show later that this periodization is 
rooted in three tendencies in global capitalism: centralization of capital and 
power, intra-core rivalries and wars, and resistance from the periphery.
A more disaggregated analysis reveals important variations in the patterns 
of unequal development across diﬀ  erent regions. Table Two presents data on 
these patterns from 1820 to 1998. In the century preceding 1913, the United States 
extended its lead over every region of the world, but the lead varies signiﬁ  cantly 
across regions. In terms of their lag behind the United States, the diﬀ  erent 
regions fall into three classes. Th   e u.s. lead over Western Europe was the small-
est, at 1.5. Th   e u.s. had a roughly similar lead, around 3.5, over Eastern Europe, 
the former u.s.s.r and Latin America. Th   e u.s. commanded a much larger lead 
over the three remaining regions: 7.8 over East Asia and West Asia, and 9.1 over 
Africa. For the most part, these trends persist over the inter-war years, 1913–1950. 
West Asia alone signiﬁ  cantly reduced its lag with respect to the u.s.; the u.s. lead 
over this region declined from 7.8 to 5.1. In part, this was the result of growing oil 
production in several countries in this region starting in the 1920s. Th  e  former 
u.s.s.r and Latin America maintain their lag at a nearly constant level. 
Th   e most visible reversal of the previous trends occurs between 1950 and 
1973. Five of the seven regions reduce their lag behind the United States in 1913, 
while Latin America manages to maintain its lag at a constant level. Only Africa 
slips behind, but the rate of slippage is slower than before. However, the old 
trends towards greater inequalities resumed after 1973. Apart from East Asia 
and Western Europe, all the other regions fall behind over 1973–1990 as well as 
1990–1998, although the larger slippage occurs in the ﬁ  rst of these two periods. 
Western Europe barely maintains its position relative to the United States. Th  e 
pattern of lags across regions have also changed somewhat between 1950 and 
1998. As before, Western Europe is still in a class by itself; Japan (not shown 
separately) also belongs in this category. Africa belongs at the opposite pole: the 
u.s. lead over this region was 20 to one in 1998. Th   e u.s. lead over Sub-Saharan 
Africa would be still larger. Th  e  ﬁ  ve remaining regions fall in an intermediate 
class, clearly separated from Western Europe (or Japan) and Africa. Th  e  u.s. 
lead over these regions varies between 4.7 (for Latin America) and 8.0 (for East 
Asia).
Finally, consider the global disparities in 2002 by income classes; this is pre-
sented in Table Th   ree using data and categories from the World Bank. Th  e  World 
Bank divides the world into three income categories: High Income Countries 
(HICs), Middle Income Countries (MICs), and Low Income Countries; the 
MICs are further divided into Low MICs and High MICs. Th   e LICs make up 
40.2 percent of the world population; the u.s. lead over this category is 17.2. Th  e 
u.s. lead over the MICs, constituting 44.2 percent of the world population, is 
considerably smaller at 6.2. Th  e  HICs  minus the u.s.—with 10.9 percent of the 
world population—lag the u.s. by a factor of 1:1.4, a relatively small lag. 
5. concluding remarks
It may be useful at this stage to examine what the pattern of global dispari-
ties—their timing and evolution— might say about the forces that may have been 
at work behind the emergence of these disparities and their changing patterns over 
time.
Table 3 – Global Disparities by Income Categories 
HICs
minus usa
HICs HMICs LMICs MICs
PCI 24,390 27,590 9220 5130 5630 2040
US Lead Over 1.4 1.3 3.8 6.8 6.2 17.2
World Pop. (%) 10.9 15.6 5.3 38.9 44.2 40.2
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